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BAKER V.

STATE

DOUBLE JEOPARDY: MISTRIAL DECLARED
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF DEFENDANT AS A BAR
TO REPROSECUTION
Baker v. State'
As co-defendants Baker and Whitfield were being tried for
1

15 Md. App. 73, 289 A.2d 348 (1972), cert. denied (Md. June 29, 1972) (Nos. 134,

212

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXXIII

conspiracy to murder, the trial court noticed that a juror could
have overheard and been prejudiced by arguments on a motion
for acquittal made after the state had presented its case. Although no formal motions were made, counsel for Baker made
clear his desire that a mistrial be declared, while counsel for
Whitfield made it equally clear that he opposed a mistrial.2 The
trial court considered the possibility of questioning the juror to
determine what prejudice had actually occurred, but concluded
that this could not be done in light of Baker's objection. The court
then declared a mistrial and discharged the jury.
Shortly before the date set for retrial the defendants moved
to dismiss the indictments, claiming that reprosecution was
barred by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.'
After a hearing, the court issued a written opinion and order
denying the motion. Stating its reasons for declaring the mistrial,
the court said that "[i]f it erred in its judgment, it was occasioned only by its desire to see that the defendants got as fair a
trial as possible."' Baker and Whitfield appealed from the order,
and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting. All three judges agreed that since Baker had insisted
upon a mistrial, he had waived any fifth amendment protection
from reprosecution to which he might otherwise have been entitled.' Whitfield's situation, however, raised a more difficult problem since he had strongly objected to a mistrial.
2. The trial court itself first raised the mistrial issue, stating, "[I]f there's anybody
that feels prejudiced at this time please say so. I don't want to go further with the trial if
you feel so." Id. at 91, 289 A.2d at 358.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in part: "nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.
See generally J. SIGLER,
DOUBLE JEOPARDY (1969).
4. Id. at 93, 289 A.2d at 360. The mistrial was declared on June 22, 1971, and the
motion to dismiss was argued on September 27, 1971, over three months later. The written
opinion on the motion to dismiss was an attempt to justify the mistrial on the grounds
that any other course of action would have been prejudicial to the defendants. This
position, however, seems inconsistent with the court's stance at trial, where it appeared
to be willing to resolve the issue by speaking with the juror in question. After noticing the
juror it asked, "Would it be sufficient to ask the juror, after lunch, whether he heard
anything or do you want to rest on the assumption that he did? That's entirely up to you."
Id. at 91, 289 A.2d at 359.
5. Judge Orth relied on dictum in United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964), to
support his conclusion that a request for a mistrial prevents the accused from later asserting the claim of double jeopardy. Tateo had succeeded in having his conviction overturned
in collateral proceedings because his guilty plea at the trial was coerced by the trial court,
and the Supreme Court held that retrial was not barred under the circumstances. In an
attempt to distinguish Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963), in which it was
held that reprosecution was barred by a mistrial declared because of the absence of a
prosecution witness, the Court said that "If Tateo had requested a mistrial on the basis
of the judge's comments, there would be no doubt that if he had been successful, the
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The majority explained that after Benton v. Maryland' made
the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause applicable to the
states, Supreme Court interpretations of the clause became the
supreme law of Maryland; it lamented, however, that the divisiveness of the Court on the double jeopardy-mistrial issue made
the task of determining the proper interpretation somewhat more
difficult.7 The court then discussed the major Supreme Court
cases in the area, and concluded that the trial judge had not
committed an abuse of discretion which would bar retrial. This
note will discuss that holding in the light of the Supreme Court
precedent on double jeopardy in the context of a mistrial.'

I
The leading case in the double jeopardy-mistrial area is
United States v. Perez,' in which it was held that reprosecution
was not barred after the discharge of a jury due to their inability
to agree on a verdict."0 In explaining the Court's decision, Justice
Story said:
"We think that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury
from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking
all circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest
necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would
otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the
circumstances, which would render it proper to interfere. To
Government would not have been barred from retrying him." 377 U.S. at 467. This emphasis on the accused's reaction to a potentially prejudicial situation tends to cloud the true
issue: whether the trial judge has unnecessarily deprived the defendant of his "...
[VIalued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal .... ." Wade v.
Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949); see United States v. Walden, 448 F.2d 925, 929-31 (4th
Cir 1971), which held that the double jeopardy clause barred reprosecution after a mistrial
declared with the consent of the accused when it appeared that the trial court would have
declared the mistrial in any event; but see United States v. Henderson, 439 F.2d 531 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), wherein the Court rejected the appellant's argument that he moved for a
mistrial only after the trial court thrust that course of action upon him.
6. 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969). Benton overruled, in the context of the double jeopardy
clause, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), under which the fourteenth amendment
due process standard was the only federal restraint on state double jeopardy law.
7. 15 Md. App. at 78, 289 A.2d at 351.
8. Double jeopardy problems are also raised by several distinct situations not related
to the mistrial problem. See generally 69 MIcH. L. REv. 762 (1971) (collateral estoppel in
criminal prosecutions); 56 MINN. L. REv. 646 (1972) (multiple offenses arising from the
same act); 38 TENN. L. REv. 562 (1971) (harsher sentence after retrial); 11 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 946 (1970) (overlapping federal and state jurisdiction).
9. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
10. Id. at 580.
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be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest caution,
under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious
causes; and, in capital cases especially, Courts should be
extremely careful how they interfere with any of the chances
of life, in favor of the prisoner.""
Subsequent cases decided by the Supreme Court have consistently applied the Perez "manifest necessity" standard in determining whether the declaration of a mistrial was a bar to further
prosecution of the accused. Reprosecutions have been allowed in
cases involving mistrials brought on by interruptions or breakdowns which, even if foreseeable, were unavoidable." Thus
11. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580. The Perez manifest necessity standard has been
almost universally accepted. The American Law Institute adopted the standard using
language which was somewhat more specific. A 1935 draft on the subject of double jeopardy the provision on mistrials reads as follows:
Discharge of jury-effect of. If during the trial of a person for an offense the jury is
discharged before verdict rendered because it is impossible to proceed with the trial,
or to proceed without manifest injustice to the defendant or to the state, or the
defendant consents to or otherwise waives such discharge, the defendant may be
again prosecuted for the same offense. If the jury is discharged, before verdict
rendered, for any other cause than those above specified, without the consent of,
or waiver by the defendant, such discharge is a bar to a subsequent prosecution of
the defendant for any offense of which he might have been convicted on the former
trial.
A.L.I. ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: DouBLE JEOPARDY sec. 7 (1935). The 1962
proposed draft attempted even greater specificity than the 1935 draft. It states that reprosecution is barred when:
(4) The former prosecution was improperly terminated. Except as provided in this
Subsection, there is an improper termination of a prosecution if the termination is for
reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and it takes place after the first witness is sworn
but before verdict. Termination under any of the following circumstances is not improper:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination or waives, by motion to dismiss or
otherwise, his right to object to the termination.
(b) The trial court finds that the termination is necessary because:
(1) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with law; or
(2) there is a legal defect in the proceedings which would make any judgment
entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or
(3) prejudicial conduct, in or outside the courtroom, makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to either the defendant or the State; or
(4) the jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(5) false statements of a juror on voire dire prevent a fair trial.
MODEL PENAL CODE sec. 1.08 (4) (P.O.D. 1962). The comments which accompanied this
section in its tentative draft stage show that the new guidelines were nothing more than
a restatement of the Perez standard. After referring to reasons justifying termination, the
commentators said: "Many courts have subsumed all of these reasons under the single
test of 'manifest necessity'. The proposed draft is somewhat more specific ..
" MODEL
PENAL CODE sec. 1.09, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956) (Section 1.09 was renumbered
1.08 in the 1962 Proposed Official Draft).
For a contrasting view see 20 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 189, 220-201 (1965), in which the
author urges abandonment of the manifest necessity standard on the grounds that it is
unworkable. The author's assertion appears to be unique.
12. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 480, 481-82 (1971).
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prosecution has been allowed after mistrials declared because of
the partiality of a juror,'3 because a juror had been a member of
an indicting grand jury," and because of the tactical position of
an army in the field.15 The wisdom of allowing retrials under these
circumstances cannot be questioned. If mistrials induced by uncontrollable eventualities categorically operated to prevent reprosecution of a defendant, the loss of respect for the courts and the
injustice to society which would result from such a haphazard
policy would far outweigh its benefit.'" The court in Baker, however, allowed reprosecution in a case in which the defendant opposed a mistrial which in all likelihood could have been avoided
by a minimum of curative action on the part of the trial court.'7
The court's reasoning in so doing was based not on a strict
application of the Perez standard but on variations on that
standard which the court found in other Supreme Court cases.
II
In United States v. Jorn,'" the trial court had declared a
mistrial to warn the state's witnesses of their fifth amendment
13. Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
14. Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894).
15. In Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949), the Court held that reprosecution was
not barred when a court martial being held in a combat zone had to be discontinued
because of a tactical maneuver.
16. In United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971), the Court said,
[A] criminal
[...
trial is, even in the best of circumstances, a complicated affair to manage.
... and that
"... [A] mechanical rule prohibiting retrial whenever circumstances compel the discharge of a jury without the defendant's consent would be too high a price to pay for the
added assurance of personal security and freedom from governmental harassment which
such a mechanical rule would provide." 400 U.S. at 479-80.
17. Judge Moylan, dissenting in the Court of Special Appeals, set forth the alternatives available to the trial court:
The trial court was admittedly faced with an awkward situation when two codefendants pulled in separate directions. It did not, however, in my judgment,
persevere sufficiently in exploring whether the juror in question had heard any
argument at all or, even in that eventuality, had heard such argument as would be
likely to prejudice him against the defendants. It did not explore with the defense
counsel the possibility of seating an alternate juror. The trial court indicated that
it foreswore this possibility out of solicitude for the two black defendants, since the
replacement would have worked to remove the only black juror on the panel. I
believe that the appellant Whitfield should have been permitted the option of
weighing whatever advantage he thought that black juror might have been to him
versus the disadvantage of having his trial aborted and having to go through the
entire procedure again. Nor do I feel that the trial court gave sufficient consideration to the possibility of severing the two defendants and proceeding with the trial
as to Whitfield, notwithstanding the mistrial as to Baker.
15 Md. App. at 112, 289 A.2d at 369; cf. Oelke v. United States, 389 F.2d 668 (9th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968).
18. 400 U.S. 470 (1971), noted in 32 LA. L. Rav. 145 (1971).
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rights when it was abundantly clear to all but the apparently
confused trial court that the witnesses had already been so
warned and had knowingly elected to testify. The Supreme Court
held that reprosecution was barred since the trial court had needlessly declared the mistrial, thereby failing to conform its actions
to the Perez "manifest necessity" standard. 9 Justice Stewart dissented, however, believing that reprosecution should be allowed
so long as a trial court's acts do not "harm" or "prejudice" the
accused. 0
The court in Baker decided that this dissenting opinion provided the appropriate standard for determining whether the double jeopardy clause bars reprosecution after the declaration of a
mistrial. Since there was no majority opinion in Jorn, but only a
plurality of four, the Court of Special Appeals stated that it was
free to apply the reasoning of the dissenting opinion to the Baker
19. 400 U.S. at 487. Speaking for a plurality of four, Justice Harlan adhered to a
strict interpretation of the Perez manifest necessity standard. Although he recognized that
Gori could be taken to suggest a variation on the standard based on the trial court's intent
to "benefit" the accused, he made clear his conviction that the policy of the double
jeopardy clause would not be served by rules based on an after the fact determination of
"benefit". 400 U.S. at 483. But see United States v. Pappas, 445 F.2d 1194, 1200 (3d Cir.
1971). He emphasized that the policy underlying the double jeopardy provision is that:
[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting
him to embarassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty.
400 U.S. at 489, quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
Equally as strong as the Court's insistence that unnecessary proscution is the "jeopardy" against which the fifth amendment guards, was its conviction that the accused has
a ". . . significant interest in the decision whether or not to take the case from the jury
when circumstances occur which might be though to warrant the declaration of a
mistrial." 400 U.S. at 485. Encompassing these considerations, the Perez doctrine: "...
stands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant's option until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice
would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings." Id. at 485. Since the Court
was convinced that the trial court had precipitously aborted the defendant's trial, it
concluded that reprosecution was barred. Justice Harlan was joined by Chief Justice
Burger, and Justices Douglas and Marshall. Justices Black and Brennan believed that the
Court lacked jurisdiction to review the case and therefore concurred in the judgment but
not the opinion. Justice Stewart dissented in an opinion joined by Justices White and
Blackmun.
20. Justice Stewart asserted that "The real question is whether there has been an
'abuse' of the trial process resulting in prejudice to the accused ....
" 400 U.S. at 492
(emphasis added). Later, in applying this standard he argued that "[e]xcept for the
inconvenience of delay always caused by a mistrial, the judge's ruling could not possibly
have injured the defendant. . . . There is, of course, no showing of an intent on the part
of the prosecutor or the judge to harass the defendant or to enhance the chances of
conviction in a second trial." 400 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
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case. 2 This standard focuses not on whether the trial court has
blundered according to standards of good trial practice, but
rather on whether the trial court intended to benefit the accused
by its actions, and on whether the accused was "prejudiced"
thereby." Since the majority in Baker was convinced that the
trial court had acted in the "interest" of the accused and that the
accused would not be strategically disadvantaged by the mistrial,
2
it held that reprosecution was not barred. 1
The seed of Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Jorn, and
in turn of the majority opinion in Baker, is found in Gori v.
United States.24 At first glance it appears that the Court in Gori
had swerved from its past insistence on a strict interpretation of
the "manifest necessity" standard. Indeed, Judge Moylan, dissenting in Baker, characterized Gori as an "aberration on the
theme of Perez. 12 5 Instead of allowing retrial only when a mistrial

had been declared because of manifest necessity the majority of
five in Gori appeared to suggest that there could be a retrial when
there was manifest necessity or when the trial court thought there
21. 15 Md. App. at 82-83, 289 A.2d at 353-54; see Bartholimay v. State, 267 Md.
175, 197-200, 297 A.2d 696, 708-09 (Md. 1972) (dissenting opinion) wherein Judge Barnes
argues that it is the duty of state judges to follow state law unless the Supreme Court of
the United States produces a majority holding.
22. See note 26 supra. Justice Stewart's "prejudice" test would close the reviewing
court's eyes to the primary purpose of the double jeopardy clause preventing the burden
of a needless second trial. This overriding factor is discounted to zero value. Conceivably,
an application of this test would allow any number of reprosecutions after needless mistrials. It seems that the only question which Justice Stewart would ask is whether the
accused had a better chance of winning acquittal in his first trial than he would in his
second. The glaring error of this reasoning is that it ignores the fact that the accused has
already decided to take his chances with the jury sitting in the first trial. He has decided
that a second trial would be more likely to end in his conviction than the first. Justice
Stewart, on the other hand, would substitute the after-the-fact decision of the appellate
court which could not possibly make anything more than a haphazard guess concerning
the comparative strategic position of the accused.
Judge Moylan in his dissent in Baker, vigorously attacked Justice Stewart's position,
stating:
"I find the opinion of Justice Stewart permits its focus to wander from the fixed
star of the fundamental purpose to be served. Its reasoning is circular. It begins with
lip service to the fundamental protection against prejudice, discusses the exceptions to that protection, and ends by defining 'abuse' in terms of 'prejudice'. In the
course of tracing the circle, however, 'prejudice' shifts its meaning. 'Prejudice,' in
the first instance, contemplated the very act of standing trial or being placed in
jeopardy; 'prejudice,' in the second instance, contemplates being placed at a disadvantage or in a position of greater peril upon the retrial."
15 Md. App. at 110, 289 A.2d at 368.
23. 15 Md. App. at 101-102, 289 A.2d at 361.
24. 367 U.S. 364 (1961).
25. 15 Md.App. 102, 289 A.2d 366 (dissenting opinion).
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was manifest necessity. However, this common interpretation of
Gori5 breaks down under analysis.
Gori's first trial was abruptly ended by the court after a
difficult proceeding marked by antagonism between the prosecution and the trial judge.27 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit said that the reason for the mistrial was not clear, but
concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion.28 The
Supreme Court was also forced to speculate as to the reason for
the mistrial, but in the absence of an adequate record of the trial
court proceedings, the Court deferred to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals that there had been no abuse of discretion.29
Because of this amorphous factual posture, any interpretation of
Gori involves a great deal more speculation than would be acceptable for valid analysis. Moreover, the strongest language in support of the Baker decision is, at best, merely suggestive dicta:
"Suffice that we are unwilling, where it clearly appears that a
mistrial has been granted in the sole interest of the defendant, to
'' 30
hold that its necessary consequence is to bar all reprosecution.
The logical structure of this statement is open-ended, allowing a
number of interpretations. The only valid assertion which can be
drawn from it, however, is that the Court would not in all circumstances preclude retrial when a mistrial has been granted in the
interest of the accused. One could hardly disagree with the propriety of this statement. There are, of course, many situations in
which mistrials can be granted in the interest of the accused
without necessarily barring reprosecution.3' Gori, therefore, cannot be considered as setting forth any strong legal rule or proposition. Rather it must be recognized that there emanates from Gori
no more than a suggestion that reviewing courts should not be
overly strict with trial courts which have acted in the interest of
the accused, under circumstances requiring hairline decisions."2
Thus viewed, Gori is not the aberration on the Perez manifest
26. See, e.g., United States v. Pappas, 445 F.2d 1194, 1200 (3d Cir. 1971), in which
the court cited Gori to support the proposition that reprosecution is not barred after a
mistrial declared out of solicitude for the "interest" of the accused.
27. United States v. Gori, 282 F.2d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 1960).
28. Id. at 48.
29. 367 U.S. at 367 n. 8.
30. Id. at 369 (emphasis added). The reasoning of Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Jorn can be traced to this intimation.
31. See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
32. "We would not thus make them [trial courts] unduly hesitant conscientiously
to exercise their most sensitive judgment-according to their own lights in the immediate
exigencies of trial-for the more effective protection of the criminal accused." 367 U.S. at
369-70. See 5 CRIM. L. BULL. 375, 382.
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necessity doctrine which Judge Moylan suggested it might be;33
nor is it valid support for Justice Stewart's Jorn opinion which
later became the foundation of the court's opinion in Baker.34
The confusion in Gori was clarified in part by Downum v.
United States,3 5 which held that reprosecution was barred by the
declaration of a mistrial because of the unavailability of prosecution witnesses, even though no evidence had been heard by the
jury and retrial took place only two days later. The defendant had
been charged with eight counts of uttering checks stolen from the
mail. Although the unavailable witness was to testify on only two
of the eight counts, the trial court discharged the jury. The harassment of the accused involved no more than his appearing in
court on the day assigned, witnessing the discharge of the jury,
and waiting two days for a new trial to begin. He was not victimized by the trial court; nor was he strategically disadvantaged.
The Court's holding that the double jeopardy clause barred
reprosecution under these circumstances did not end all of the
speculation engendered by Gori, but it did define the type of
protection provided by the double jeopardy clause. More specifically, the lesson of Downum runs contra to the intimation by
Justice Stewart's dissent in Jorn that the double jeopardy clause
is merely a shield against "prejudice" which may attach to a
second trial because of a mistrial in the first.3" Rather, Downum
instructed that the very act of needlessly standing trial a second
time was the harassment from which the accused was protected
by the double jeopardy clause, making it clear that "[TIhe prohibition of the Double Jeopardy Clause is 'not against being twice
punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy.' " But in
spite of Downum's lesson on the meaning of harassment, the
majority in Baker viewed Gori not as an ambiguous suggestion,
but rather as setting forth a well-founded rule which would deny
the plea of double jeopardy to a defendant faced with reprosecution after the most unnecessary of mistrials declared by the most
careless of trial courts-so long as the trial court was wellintentioned and the defendant would not be strategically disadvantagd by the trial, no matter how financially and psychologi33. 289 A.2d at 366.
34. "We are satisfied that 'abuse of judicial discretion' is to be assessed by the
manifest necessity standard of Perez as explicated by Gori. We are persuaded that the
proper interpretation of Gori is that of the Stewart opinion in Jorn." Id. at 358.
35. 372 U.S. 734 (1963), noted in 77 HARv.L. REV. 1272 (1964); see also 82 HARV. L.
REv. (1969) analyzing Carsey v. United States, 392 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1967), which relied
heavily upon Downum.
36. See note 28 supra.
37. 373 U.S. at 736, quoting United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896).
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cally burdensome that new trial might be.
The majority in Baker, by taking pains to demonstrate that
Jorn was not binding on the state of Maryland, impliedly conceded that the reasoning of the plurality in Jorn would have required a different result than the one reached. Judge Moylan in
his dissenting opinion agreed, but unlike the majority he vigorously argued for that different result, registering his disapproval
of Justice Stewart's Jorn opinion and his praise of the plurality
opinion of Justice Harlan. It is submitted that Judge Moylan's
praise is well placed and that society would best be served by a
strict adherence to the Perez manifest necessity doctrine, as interpreted by Justice Harlan in Jorn. A recognition of the heavy
economic burden involved in conducting an effective defense
should alone be sufficient incentive for judicial diligence in seeing
that the valuable labors of defense counsel are not rendered
worthless by judicial indiscretion. By requiring that trials not be
aborted in the absence of imperious necessity, the courts would
protect the accused and society from the unwanted and unnecessary anxiety and expense of repeated prosecutions.
Moreover, the theory proposed by Justice Stewart in Jorn
and followed by the majority in Baker would prove unworkable.
A rule based on who benefited by an unnecessary mistrial would
be no more than a springboard for speculation. Present day trials
are far advanced in comparison with the trials of long ago, which
were settled with sword and lance. But even though the weapons
have been replaced with words, today's trial lawyers are not so
much unlike their ancient counterparts, skilled in the use of tactics and ever aware of the flow of battle. Appellate courts, viewing
a cold record, do not have the benefit of this "sixth sense" of the
trial lawyer and are therefore unable to properly analyze a trial
in terms of who was winning or losing at a particular point.
III
Since Baker the Supreme Court has handed down a new
decision in the double-jeopardy mistrial area. In Illinois v.
Somerville, 31 the defendant was brought to trial on a defective
indictment. 3 After the jury had been impaneled and sworn, the
point at which jeopardy "attaches" 4 in jury trials, the trial court,
38. 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
39. Id. at 459-60.
40. Although it was not a problem in Baker, misuse of the phrase "jeopardy attaches" has been a source of much confusion and deserves some attention.
Complexities abound in the law of double jeopardy, and the problems have been

1973]

BAKER V.

STATE

over the defendant's objection, granted the prosecution's motion
for a mistrial on the ground that further proceedings under the
defective indictment would be useless.4' Somerville was retried
and convicted after the trial court rejected his plea of doublejeopardy. After the state appellate courts affirmed the conviction,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
granted habeas corpus relief.4" The Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals and held that there existed "manifest necessity"
for the trial court's declaration of a mistrial.43
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of five, centered his
opinion on United States v. Perez, thereby reaffirming the viability of the "manifest necessity" standard. The Court refused, however, to set down a strict formula which could be used to define
the standard's elusive contours. Rather, the Court cited past
cases with the unmistakable aim of emphasizing the standard's
flexibility, prefacing its discussion with the assertion that the
compounded by a willingness of the courts to merely repeat black-letter law handed down
by their predecessors rather than making a much needed attempt at explanation. As
Professor Charles Wright observed: "Labels are not bad things in the law if they are
understood for what they are, a shorthand way of expressing the result of a more complicated reasoning process. Labels become treacherous and misleading if they are applied as
substitute for reasoning." C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTs 297 (2d ed. 1970).
The phrase "jeopardy attaches" is one of those black-letter labels which may once
have been useful but which now fosters more confusion than clarity. Faced with having
to allow retrial after saying that jeopardy had "attached", courts have produced verbiage
to the effect that: Jeopardy hadn't "really" attached, but only "apparently" attached;
People v. Hunckelor, 48 Cal. 331, 334 (1874); see J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 89 (1969);
or they have conveniently avoided vigorous analysis by saying that jeopardy "depends"
on a presumption of "complete proceedings". State v. Emery, 59 Vt. 84, 88, 7 A. 129, 133
(1886). Likewise in Hernandez v. Nelson, 298 F. Supp. 682 (N.D. Cal. 1968), the issue
presented to the court was whether reprosecution was barred by the double jeopardy
clause after any of three mistrials. The court erroneously framed the issue in terms of
whether "jeopardy attached." 298 F. Supp. at 687. Jeopardy had, of course, "attached"
when the jury was empanelled in each trial. This, however, still left open the entirely
different question of whether reprosecution was barred.
Much to Justice Harlan's credit is his effort in Jorn to end judicial cobweb-spinning
around the question of when "jeopardy attaches". He explained that:
The conclusion that "jeopardy attaches" when the trial commences expresses a
judgment that the constitutional policies underpinning the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee are implicated at that point in the proceeding. The question remains,
however, in what circumstances retrial is to be precluded when the initial proceedings are aborted prior to verdict without the defendant's consent.
400 U.S. at 480. Thus, it is a policy rather than a ban which "attaches". This simply
means that once the jury is sworn, the double jeopardy clause dictates that certain actions
of the parties may, if they result in mistrial, induce the raising of the bar against further
prosecution of the accused. The phrase should under no circumstances be used to express
the conclusion that this bar has been raised.
41. 410 U.S. at 460.
42. United States ex rel. Somerville v. Illinois, 447 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1971).
43. 410 U.S. at 471.
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Perez standard ". . . abjures the application of any mechanical
formula by which to judge the propriety of declaring a mistrial
in the varying and often unique situations arising during the
course of a criminal trial."" The Court characterized the action
of the trial court as "a rational determination" which, in the
Court's view, contrasted with the "erratic" action of the trial
court in Jorn.45 Moreover, the Court relegated the concept of lack
of "prejudice," a cornerstone of the Baker decision, to a minor
role in the determination of whether reprosecution is barred:
"Nor will the lack of demonstrable additional prejudice preclude
the defendant's invocation of the double jeopardy bar in the absence of some important countervailing interest of proper judicial

administration. "46

Although the majority in Somerville did not concern itself
with a situation in which the trial court had capriciously declared
a mistrial in an attempt to "benefit" the accused, one must conclude that the erratic behavior of the trial court in Baker would
be found by the present Court to be the type of action against
which the double jeopardy clause was designed to protect. The
determinative factor in allowing reprosecution in Somerville was
that the trial court had made a rational decision ". . . designed
to implement the State's policy of preserving the right of each
defendant to insist that a criminal prosecution against him be
commenced by the action of a grand jury. ' 47 The Court concluded
that "if a mistrial were constitutonally unavailable in situations
such as this, the State's policy could only be implemented by
conducting a second trial after verdict and reversal on appeal,
48
thus wasting time, energy, and money for all concerned.
The mistrial declaration in Baker was neither "rational" nor
designed to implement a state policy. The trial court's action was
hasty and unwarranted, and it denied the accused of his interest
in . . having his fate determined by the jury first impaneled
. an interest which the court in Somerville characterized
as "weighty." 50 Most striking, however, is the conspicuous absence of a worthwhile purpose to be served by such a mistrial
declaration. Indeed, the mistrial rendered the entire proceeding
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

462.
469.
471.
468.
469.
471.
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a "waste of time, energy, and money for all concerned", in addition to putting the defendant through the unnecessary anxiety
and expense of a new trial.5 '
CONCLUSION

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals stands alone in its
adherence to the Stewart opinion in Jorn.21 Its reasoning seemingly rests upon the questionable theory that Jorn,because of the
configuration of opinions, provided no definitive Supreme Court
statement of the constitutional requirements of the double jeopardy clause in this area; the Court's decision in Somerville should
therefore have removed all doubt as to the unacceptability of the
Baker standard by providing such a statement. However, the
Court of Special Appeals has recently reaffirmed its position in
Baker, stating that: "We see nothing in Illinois v. Somerville,
supra, to cause us to change our view." 3 Clarification of the
Maryland double jeopardy law relating to mistrials will come only
through unequivocal rejection of the Baker standard.
51. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
52. See, e.g., Clemenson v. Municipal Court, 18 Cal. App. 3d 442, 499, 96 Cal. Rptr.
126, 129-30 (1971); People v. Gardner, 37 Mich. App. 520, 195 N.W.2d 62 (1972).
53. Jones v. State, 17 Md. App. 504, 516, 302 A.2d 639, 645 (1973).

